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Abstract This paper demonstrates the relevance of con-
sumers’ susceptibility to interpersonal influence (CSII) in
an investment context. In Study 1, a survey of individual
investors, investment-related knowledge, psycho-social
risks, and social needs emerge as antecedents that explain
investors’ susceptibility to informational and normative
influence. In turn, susceptibility to normative influences
increases transaction frequency, whereas susceptibility to
informational influences decreases transaction frequency.
The experiments in Studies 2 and 3 indicate the impact of
interpersonal influences on consumers’ investment deci-
sions in a voluntary (free choice) and involuntary (con-
frontation) setting and check whether CSII moderates the
impact of interpersonal influences. Consumers’ investment
choices are consistently influenced by the information and
opinions of others, whereas CSII only strengthens the
impact of interpersonal influence in a voluntary informa-
tional setting.
Keywords Susceptibility to interpersonal influence .
Investments . Reference-group influence
Introduction
“We are influenced by others in almost every
activity, and this includes investment and financial
transactions.”
—Hirschleifer & Teoh 2003: 25
Consumers often use social information when making
their decisions, especially in uncertain situations (Mitchell
and McGoldrick 1996). The extent to which social
information affects consumers’ decisions depends on their
susceptibility to interpersonal influence.
Susceptibility to interpersonal influence is a consumer
trait that varies across individuals (McGuire 1968). The
important effects of consumers’ susceptibility to interper-
sonal influence (CSII) on their decision-making processes
have been documented extensively in consumer behavior
and marketing literature (Bearden et al. 1989, 1990; Bristol
and Mangleburg 2005; Kropp et al. 1999; Mascarenhas and
Higby 1993; Mourali et al. 2005; Ratner and Kahn 2002).
However, none of these studies address consumers’
investment decisions. Existing CSII studies focus on
conspicuous and socially visible products such as cars
(Bearden and Rose 1990), apparel (Meyer and Anderson
2000; Miller 1998), or women’s cosmetics (Chao and Schor
1998). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is first to
demonstrate the relevance of CSII for less conspicuous and
visible product categories in general by examining its
effects in an investment setting.
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Although investments’ low visibility may suggest they
are privately consumed products, the opening quote
suggests that social information could play an important
role in consumers’ investment decisions. On the one hand,
consumers often deliberately increase the visibility of their
investment decisions and expose themselves to public
scrutiny by engaging in related social interactions, such as
joining investment clubs (Barber and Odean 2000), or
discussing their investment decisions and performance with
other stock market participants (Hong et al. 2004). On the
other hand, consumer research argues that both the real and
the imagined presence of others significantly influence
people’s behavior (Kropp et al. 1999: 537). Even in the
absence of direct visibility, investors may be concerned
about which investments will make a good impression on
others.
Studying susceptibility to and the impact of interpersonal
influences in an investment context is relevant for market-
ing research and practice for several reasons. First, no
theory of consumption can be complete without including
an understanding of how consumers manage their wealth
(Zhou and Pham 2004). Consumers’ current investment
choices have considerable consequences for their current
and future consumption (cf. Browning and Crossley 2001),
so from this perspective, it seems surprising that marketing
research has paid so little attention to investment decisions
(Johnson and Tellis 2005; Johnson et al. 2005; Zhou and
Pham 2004), and even less attention to how they are
influenced by others. Second, individual investors hold
about 50% of U.S. equity (Odean and Barber 2000), which
means consumers’ investment decisions can help explain
the overall dynamics of financial markets. This topic is
especially important with regard to the population’s aging
demographics and the increased self-responsibility of
consumers for their retirement accounts. Third, CSII has
important consequences for consumer behavior. Recent
studies on consumer innovativeness (Clark and Goldsmith
2006; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003), for example, show
that consumers who are susceptible to the influence of
others are less inclined to purchase innovative products,
such as new financial services, early. Considering the size
of the financial services industry, the failure of approxi-
mately 50% of all financial innovations (Edgett 1994), and
the benefits of new products for financial service providers
(Storey and Easingwood 1999), marketers must begin to
study the role of CSII in an investment context. Fourth,
examining CSII in an investment context has societal
relevance. Consumers who are more susceptible to social
influences are more likely to engage in conformist behavior,
which affects asset prices (De Bondt 1998) and may result in
herding behavior (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Hirschleifer
2001; Shiller 1995). Herding is considered one of the driving
forces behind the Internet Bubble (Kindleberger 2000) and
can also be associated with the recent turmoil on financial
markets sparked by the “credit crunch”. Policymakers worry
that herding can destabilize markets and increase the fragility
of financial systems (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000).
Therefore, it is important to investigate what kind of people
are most likely to be highly influenced by others with respect
to their investment behavior and engage in conformist or
herding behavior.
We investigate, through a survey study and two
experimental studies, the kinds of consumers who are
susceptible to interpersonal influence and how they react to
those interpersonal influences. The survey study identifies
the general traits and dispositions that make consumers
most susceptible to interpersonal influence and clarifies the
effect of this susceptibility on the number of investment
transactions in which they participate. In the two experi-
mental studies, we investigate the impact of the social
environment on actual investment behaviors by confronting
subjects with informational and normative influences
(Study 2) or giving them the option to receive interpersonal
information or opinions (Study 3). Thus, we investigate the
effects of both passively receiving and actively requesting
interpersonal influence. In both experiments, we test
whether CSII moderates the effect of interpersonal influ-
ence on consumers’ investment decisions.
In so doing, we contribute to the literature in several
ways. Most importantly, this is the first paper to empirically
investigate CSII and the effects of interpersonal influences
for a less conspicuous and visible product. In addition, by
taking the antecedents and consequences of CSII into
account, we add to the emerging but limited body of
research that positions CSII in a nomological net (Batra et
al. 2001). Although current literature associates CSII with a
variety of variables, such as self-esteem, attention to social
comparison information (ATSCI), motivation to comply,
public self-consciousness, and consumer innovativeness
(Bearden et al. 1989, 1990; Bearden and Rose 1990; Clark
and Goldsmith 2006; Lascu et al. 1995; Steenkamp and
Gielens 2003), it is uncommon that these accumulated
research findings appear united in a theoretical framework.
Finally, we use experimental data for the first time to show
how interpersonal influences affect consumers’ investment
decisions. Existing studies are often limited to involuntary
settings, which means they impose interpersonal influences
on subjects (Burnkrant and Cousineau 1975; LaTour and
Manrai 1989). This article also examines the impact of
interpersonal influences in a voluntary setting.
Study 1
Our goal for Study 1 is to place the CSII concept within a
conceptual framework and test it with an empirical survey.
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We present the theoretical background, conceptual model,
hypotheses, and results next.
Theoretical background
The most widely used measure of CSII is that developed by
Bearden et al. (1989, 1990), which distinguishes between
susceptibility to informational influences (SII) and suscep-
tibility to normative influences (SNI). The former reflects a
person’s tendency to accept information from others as
credible evidence about reality (Deutsch and Gerard 1955).
Informational influence results from actively requesting
information from knowledgeable others or passively ob-
serving others (Park and Lessig 1977). It operates through
the process of internalization, which occurs if information
from others increases an individual’s knowledge about
some aspect of the environment. Informational influence is
driven by a desire to form accurate interpretations about
reality in order to make more informed decisions and
behave correctly (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). SNI
reflects an individual’s tendency to comply with the
positive expectations of others (Deutsch and Gerard 1955:
629) and is driven by an individual’s desire to enhance
one’s self-image by association with a reference group or
because individuals want to achieve rewards or avoid
punishments mediated by others.
Previous studies relate the CSII scale to several
consumer factors, including demographics, general psycho-
graphic traits, domain-specific knowledge, personal values,
and situational factors (Batra et al. 2001; Bearden et al.
1989, 1990; Bearden and Rose 1990; Clark and Goldsmith
2005; D’Rozario and Choudhury 2000; Lascu et al. 1995;
Mangleburg et al. 2004). The aim of Study 1 is not to
provide an exhaustive list of potential correlates of invest-
ors’ susceptibility to interpersonal influence, but rather to
place this concept within a theoretical framework by
incorporating its primary antecedents and consequences.
Conceptual model
As we indicate in Fig. 1, Study 1 uses a hierarchical trait
model in which general traits and dispositions causally
precede more situation-specific traits, which then influence
a larger set of secondary traits and actions (cf. Batra et al.
2001). In our conceptual model, susceptibility to interper-
sonal influence acts as a situation-specific trait, because it
represents a “weak trait” (McGuire 1968: 1132) with low
intercorrelations across situations and behaviors (Batra et
al. 2001). A person’s influenceability often appears as a
consequence of personality variables, such as self-esteem or
social anxiety (Batra et al. 2001; Bearden et al. 1990;
McGuire 1968). Anxiety originating from a lack of
knowledge or perceptions of psychological or social risk
therefore drives a person’s influenceability. Moreover,
personal values, such as social needs, are assumed to be
important antecedents or causes of situation-specific traits
such as someone’s susceptibility to interpersonal influence
(Batra et al. 2001). Therefore, we argue that consumers’
general traits and dispositions such as their investment-
related knowledge, perceptions of social and psychologi-
cal risk, and strength of socially oriented needs determine
the more specific and situation-dependent trait of suscep-
tibility to interpersonal influences, which leads to even
more specific outcomes or behaviors, such as transaction
frequency.
The dimensions of CSII in an investment context thus
can be explained by motivations to increase the accuracy of
investment decisions by building knowledge through social
interactions, decrease the potential for social embarrassment
or psychological discomfort by learning about and con-
forming to socially accepted behavior, and fulfill social
needs by creating and maintaining valuable relationships.
Hypotheses
Antecedents of consumers’ susceptibility to interpersonal
influence
Domain-specific knowledge In an investment context,
domain-specific knowledge relates to consumers’ familiar-
ity with and expertise in making investment decisions (cf.
Alba and Hutchinson 1987). The amount of domain-
specific knowledge determines product decisions (Alba

























Figure 1 Conceptual model of
Study 1.
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bility to both informational and normative interpersonal
influence (Furse et al. 1984; Gilly et al. 1998; Mangleburg
et al. 2004). Individuals with more knowledge tend to be
more confident about making correct decisions and dem-
onstrate less interest in others’ information and opinions
(Bearden et al. 1990; Clark and Goldsmith 2006; Kahle
1995; Locander and Hermann 1979). That is, knowledge-
able consumers depend less on others to obtain relevant
product information, but they also depend less on others
with respect to the normative aspects of decision making.
They tend to be more self-confident and have higher self-
esteem, which relates negatively to the need for social
approval (Cox and Bauer 1964). Hence, more knowledge-
able consumers should be less susceptible to both informa-
tional and normative interpersonal influences.
Conversely, individuals with less knowledge are more
susceptible to informational and normative interpersonal
influences. On the one hand, those with less knowledge
may doubt their ability to make good decisions and
perceive higher risks (Alba and Hutchinson 1987), so to
reduce this risk, they may feel more compelled to ask
knowledgeable others for advice and rely more strongly on
this advice compared with those consumers who know
more and perceive less risk (Festinger 1954; Furse et al.
1984; Gilly et al. 1998; Mangleburg et al. 2004; Mitchell
and McGoldrick 1996). On the other hand, individuals with
less knowledge lack a sense of personal adequacy and may
suffer low self-confidence and self-esteem, which often
makes them excessively fearful of social disapproval and
strongly motivated to conform to others’ demands or
suggestions (Janis 1954; Cox and Bauer 1964). Their
compliance can be interpreted as a defensive form of
behavior that permits these consumers to agree with
everyone in an attempt to guarantee that nobody will be
displeased with them (Janis 1955).
H1. The amount of consumers’ investment-related knowl-
edge is negatively associated with their susceptibility
to informational influences when making investment
decisions.
H2. The amount of consumers’ investment-related knowl-
edge is negatively associated with their susceptibility
to normative influences when making investment
decisions.
Psychological and social risk In addition to product or
performance risk, consumers may also experience social
and psychological risk that discourages them from engag-
ing in behaviors that are not accepted by their reference
group or that conflict with their personality or self-image
(Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Sirgy 1982, 1985). Beyond
the possibility of losing money (product or performance
risk), consumers may be anxious that their peers will not
accept their investment choices or that they will embarrass
themselves in public or “not fit in” with specific reference
groups (social risk). Moreover, consumers run the risk of
experiencing psychological discomfort or frustration if their
actions are not consistent with their self-concept or self-
image (psychological risk). In general, status-conscious
consumers perceive greater psycho-social risks, because
they are more concerned about their self-image and worried
about not fitting in, which makes them more likely to be
affected by interpersonal influences (O’Cass and McEwen
2004). Research into the concept of purchase pals indicates
that teens frequently shop together and adjust their
decisions according to the information and opinions of
relevant others to reduce not only their functional (product
or performance) risks but also the perceived psycho-social
risks associated with purchases (Kiecker and Hartman
1993).
A recent study by Yim et al. (2007) investigates the role
of multiple referents on the evaluations of services. They
suggest that the evaluation of services depends on the
approval of others, and in particular on how well the service
fits with the self-image. They argue that higher levels of
self-image congruity (i.e., services that more closely match
one’s self-image) are associated with lower levels of
psychological discomfort or risk (cf. Sirgy 1985) and less
consideration for attractive alternatives. In a similar vein,
Kleijnen et al. (2005) find that consumers with low self-
image congruence are more susceptible to their surround-
ings than are consumers with high self-image congruence
when adopting service innovations.
This discussion implies that consumers who perceive
psycho-social risks may actively seek and rely on
information from and the opinions of social others to
reduce their risk. That is, consumers’ perception of
psycho-social risks should relate to SII and SNI. First,
consumers who perceive greater psycho-social risks tend
to be more susceptible to informational influence,
because they are motivated to build their knowledge
about socially accepted behaviors and the consequences
of their actions for their self-concept (Cialdini and
Goldstein 2004). These consumers ask relevant others so
that they may learn about the correct way to behave and
avoid future social embarrassment or psychological dis-
comfort. Therefore, psycho-social risks are positively
associated with the informational dimension of interper-
sonal influence, operating through internalization (Burnkrant
and Cousineau 1975). Second, consumers who perceive
greater psycho-social risks want to fit in and seek the
approval of social others by currently complying with
their social norms. As such, psycho-social risks should be
positively associated with the normative dimension of
interpersonal influence, operating through processes of
identification (maintaining a positive self-concept) and
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compliance (achieving social rewards) (Burnkrant and
Cousineau 1975).
H3. Consumers’ level of perceived psycho-social risk is
positively associated with their susceptibility to
informational influences when making investment
decisions.
H4. Consumers’ level of perceived psycho-social risk is
positively associated with their susceptibility to
normative influences when making investment
decisions.
Social needs Consumers engage in social interactions not
only to reduce perceived purchase risk but also to fulfill
their social needs. Humans are fundamentally motivated to
create and maintain meaningful and rewarding social
relationships (Maslow 1954). The strength of social needs
differs across individuals, and just as personal values do,
they guide individuals’ behavior by affecting the criteria
used to evaluate actions, people, and events. Personal or
human values include internal values (e.g., self-fulfillment,
sense of accomplishment, self-respect) and social or
external values (e.g., being well-respected, having warm
relationships with others) (Batra et al. 2001). Values are
motivational in nature and provide important antecedents of
situation-specific predispositions, such as CSII (cf. Batra et
al. 2001). Consumers’ importance of social values is
positively related to SNI (Batra et al. 2001; Kropp et al.
1999). On the basis of these arguments, we expect
consumers with stronger social needs to be more suscep-
tible to informational and normative interpersonal influen-
ces when they invest than are consumers who have less
explicit social needs. Consumers with stronger social needs
tend to be more open to and derive greater value from
social interactions, such as investment-related interpersonal
information exchanges (SII). Moreover, they prefer buying
stocks that they expect their reference group to approve of
or that enable them to identify with others and thus create
and maintain rewarding relationships (SNI).
H5. The strength of consumers’ social needs is positively
associated with their susceptibility to informational
influences when making investment decisions.
H6. The strength of consumers’ social needs is positively
associated with their susceptibility to normative
influences when making investment decisions.
Consequences of consumers’ susceptibility to interpersonal
influence
This study examines the effect of consumers’ susceptibility
to interpersonal influence on their yearly number of
investment transactions, which is an important variable for
consumers and policymakers alike, because overtrading
generally results in poor performance through the accumu-
lation of transaction costs (Odean and Barber 2000).
Furthermore, through commissions, consumers’ transaction
frequency directly affects banks’ and brokerage firms’
profitability.
Existing literature presents mixed and inconclusive
results regarding the possible effect of CSII on transaction
frequency (Mangleburg et al. 2004). Prior research finds a
negative relationship between CSII and willingness to
adopt new products, which may relate to hesitation to
trade. Individuals who are more susceptible to interpersonal
influences are less willing to make an adoption decision
until a majority of relevant others also supports the new
concept (Clark and Goldsmith 2006; Steenkamp and
Gielens 2003). Conversely, we can assume a positive
relationship between CSII and transaction frequency,
because consumers who are susceptible to interpersonal
influence are more receptive to environmental cues and
more likely to act on this social information. By either
conforming to or deviating from this new information, they
may trade more frequently.
On the basis of social comparison theory (Festinger
1954), we hypothesize a negative relationship between SII
and transaction frequency. That is, consumers susceptible to
informational influences may—after requesting and receiv-
ing information from other, more knowledgeable people—
receive reinforcement of their belief that they have
insufficient knowledge to make well-informed investment
decisions or obtain contradictory information. They can
limit the impact of wrong decisions by minimizing their
transactions, and they might be informed by others that a
buy-and-hold strategy is best.
We hypothesize a positive relationship between SNI and
transaction frequency, because consumers who are suscep-
tible to normative influence are more likely to get carried
away by others’ opinions and may transact to reinforce their
social bonds or comply with others’ expectations. Then,
SNI may lead to chameleon-like changes in response to any
new source of persuasive influence (Janis 1955), which
suggests more transactions.
H7. Consumers’ susceptibility to informational influence
is negatively associated with the number of invest-
ment transactions they make.
H8. Consumers’ susceptibility to normative influence is
positively associated with the number of investment
transactions they make.
Finally, we expect a direct relationship between con-
sumers’ level of investment-related knowledge and the
number of investment transactions. More knowledgeable
consumers have more expertise and are more familiar with
investing (cf. Alba and Hutchinson 1987), which likely is
492 J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2009) 37:488–503
associated with lower perceptions of risk, easier access to
financial markets, more involvement with the product
category, and a higher likelihood to transact.
H9. Consumers’ level of investment-related knowledge is
positively associated with the number of investment
transactions they make.
Research approach: Study 1
Method
We used a survey approach to collect data from individual
investors and test the hypotheses of our conceptual model
(Fig. 1). We developed and tested an online questionnaire
among 78 undergraduate and graduate students. After
revising the questionnaire wording and layout, we asked a
panel of five academics to confirm whether the items
closely resembled the intended constructs. Next, we
collected the empirical data through an online questionnaire
that targeted visitors to four investment-related Web sites,
selected because they attempt to attract respondents with
various levels of experience and backgrounds. The call to
participate provided a summary of the purpose of the study
and a link to the online questionnaire. We carefully checked
the final sample for duplicates using respondents’ IP
address and contact details. Furthermore, we told respond-
ents that their responses would remain anonymous and that
all data would be treated confidentially.
Sample
The net sample consisted of 287 investors with an average age
of 53 years (SD=13). Twelve percent of the respondents are
women, and more than two-thirds have at least a college
degree. These respondents note a considerable length of
investing experience (M=16 years, SD=11) and, on average,
transact 77 times per year (SD=122, median=30). Almost
all respondents (98%) invest for their own accounts. The
dominant purchasing channels that these investors use are as
follows: 56% online brokers, 36% banks, 4% direct
telephone order lines, and 4% expert advice. The average
portfolio size is €207,000 (approximately $310,500) with a
median of €70,000 (approximately $105,000). Among the
sample, 20% belong to an investment club.
To investigate potential selection bias, we compared these
sample characteristics with the characteristics of the general
population of investors with direct investments in the Dutch
stock market (VEB 2002). Our respondents are slightly older
(53 years compared with 48 years) and more likely to be
men (88% compared with 71%). The modal portfolio size,
however, equals that of the general investment population, at
€50,000. Also, the median portfolio size closely corresponds
with estimates from the Dutch National Bank (2006) that
show an average portfolio size per investing household of
€70,000. The respondents’ transaction frequency also
matches another Dutch sample (Bauer et al. 2007). In
conclusion, the sample appears similar to the overall
population of Dutch investors with regard to selected
background characteristics, though we also note that our
sample consists of fairly experienced investors.
Measures and research instrument
All items use five- or seven-point Likert scales to measure
the relevant constructs (Table 1). Respondents’ susceptibil-
ity to interpersonal influence employs the CSII scale
proposed by Bearden et al. (1989, 1990). The SII measure
includes all four items of the original scale, whereas the
SNI measure for our study drops one of the original eight
items because it explicitly refers to purchasing the latest
fashion. This item was potentially distracting for our
respondents and irrelevant to the investment context.
Following Bloch et al. (1989), we measure domain-
specific knowledge with self-reported measures. The two
items measuring psychological and social risk come
directly from work by Kaplan et al. (1974). To measure
respondents’ strength of social needs, we use items from
Cheek and Buss’s (1981) sociability study.
We employ standard psychometric procedures to test the
reliability and validity of the scales (Netemeyer et al. 2003;
Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). After performing reliability
analyses, we test the validity of the constructs with
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using AMOS 7 (see
Table 1). As a result, we remove two items from the SNI
scale that indicated low loadings (<0.50).
The final measurement model using maximum likelihood
estimation demonstrates acceptable fit (χ2/df=1.68, GFI=
0.94, CFI=0.96, RFI=0.89, TLI=0.95, RMSEA=0.049).1
We also find evidence of convergent validity and unidimen-
sionality, because each item loads significantly (p<0.001) on
its assigned factor and reveals insignificant cross-loadings.
Next, the average variance extracted (AVE) of all constructs
was greater than 0.50 with the exception of the SII scale,
which falls marginally below the required level (Fornell and
Larcker 1981). To establish discriminant validity, we first
note that the intercorrelations between the latent factors
1 Previous research has subdivided the concept of normative influen-
ces into value-expressive and utilitarian influences, but then collapsed
them into one normative dimension after extensive empirical analyses
(Bearden et al. 1989, 1990; Mangleburg et al. 2004). We test for a
three-factor model that divides susceptibility to normative influence
into two dimensions: utilitarian and value-expressive. The two-factor
solution results in better fit indices, and the three-factor solution leads
to inadmissible solutions (e.g., negative error terms, correlation
between value-expressive and utilitarian greater than 1). Therefore,
we prefer the two-factor model.
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(± two standard errors) do not include unity (Anderson and
Gerbing 1988) (Table 2). Furthermore, the AVE of each
latent construct is greater than the squared correlations
between any set of two constructs (Fornell and Larcker
1981). Finally, the composite reliabilities range from 0.74 to
0.88, which indicate high levels of construct reliability
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988). These analyses demonstrate that
our scales have sufficient levels of reliability, unidimension-
ality, convergent validity, and discriminant validity.
Results
We depict the structural model of Study 1 and the
significance of its relationships in Fig. 2. The data confirm
all hypotheses (H1–H9). The structural model fits the data
well (χ2/df=2.00, GFI=0.92, CFI=0.94, RFI=0.87, TLI=
0.93, RMSEA=0.059) and explains a reasonable amount of
the variance in SNI (R2=36.6%) and SII (R2=38.1%). The
antecedents account for 9.9% of the variance of consumers’
transaction frequency. The maximum variable inflation
factor (VIF) for each independent variable in a set of
regression analyses is 1.35, which suggests some but not
strong multicollinearity.2
Table 1 Measurement model results of Study 1
Construct Item wordinga SL α/CR AVE
Domain-specific knowledge
(Bloch et al. 1989)
Knowl1: How would others characterize you with regard to the level of
KNOWLEDGE you have about investing? (1=Very little knowledge,
5=Very much knowledge)
0.79 (–) 0.87/0.88 0.79
Knowl2: How would others characterize you with regard to the level of




(Kaplan et al. 1974)
Psych/socrisk1: What is the probability that an investment in an
unfamiliar stock will lead to a PSYCHOLOGICAL LOSS for you
because it would not fit well with your self image or self-concept?
(1=Very unlikely, 7=Very likely)
0.64 (–) 0.71/0.74 0.59
Psych/socrisk2: What is the probability that an investment in an
unfamiliar stock will lead to a SOCIAL LOSS for you because others
would think less highly of you? (1=Very unlikely, 7=Very likely)
0.88 (5.22)
Social needs
(Cheek and Buss 1981)
SocNeed1: I invest because I like to participate in investment related
conversations with others
0.75 (7.15) 0.74/0.74 0.59
SocNeed2: I invest because I like to affiliate with other investors 0.79 (–)
Susceptibility to
informational influence (SII)
(Bearden et al. 1989)
SII1: I frequently gather information about (type of) stock from friends
or family before I invest in them
0.69 (10.37) 0.78/0.78 0.47
SII2: To make sure I buy the right stock, I often observe what other
investors invest in
0.62 (9.47)
SII3: I often consult other people to help choose the best stock to
invest in
0.69 (9.99)
SII4: If I have little experience with a (type of) stock, I often ask my




(Bearden et al. 1989)
SNI1: I like to know what investment decisions make good impressions
on others
0.66 (11.50) 0.86/0.87 0.57
SNI2: I generally purchase those stocks that I think others will
approve of
0.70 (12.40)
SNI3: I often identify with other people by purchasing or selling the
same stocks they sell or purchase
0.81 (14.76)
SNI4: I achieve a sense of belonging by purchasing or selling the same
stocks that others purchase or sell
0.79 (14.19)
SNI5: If others can see in which stocks I invest, I often invest in stocks
that they invest in
0.81 (–)
a All items, unless otherwise noted, use five-point Likert scales, anchoring at 1 = totally disagree and 5 = totally agree
SL maximum likelihood standardized loadings with t-values in parentheses, α Cronbach’s alphas, CR composite reliabilities, AVE average
variance extracted
2 We also investigated the influence of age, gender, and investment club
membership on SII and SNI. The means do not differ across age
categories for SII (F(3, 283)=0.82, p=0.48) or SNI (F(3, 283)=0.30,
p=0.83). The means of SII and SNI also did not differ significantly
between men and women according to a t-test (p>0.10). Members of
investment clubs are significantly more susceptible to both SII (t(283)=
2.58, p=0.01) and SNI (t(283)=1.96, p=0.05). Because performing the
structural analyses without the investment club members provides very
similar results, we use the complete data set in our subsequent analyses.
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Consistent with previous studies in other contexts (Gilly
et al. 1998; Mangleburg et al. 2004; Park and Lessig 1977),
we find that consumers’ level of domain-specific knowledge
is negatively associated with both SII (H1: β=−0.19, p=
0.005) and SNI (H2: β=−0.16, p=0.010) in an investment
context. The results also support the proposed positive
associations between psycho-social risk and SII (H3: β=
0.25, p<0.001) and SNI (H4: β=0.37, p<0.001). Further-
more, consumers’ strength of social needs appears strongly
positively related to both SII (H5: β=0.40, p<0.001) and
SNI (H6: β=0.51, p<0.001).
Since the dimensions of SII and SNI are conceptually
different and operate through different mechanisms with
different goals (e.g., Cialdini and Trost 1998), the relative
strength of the antecedents may differ across these
dimensions. In particular, SII relates more strongly to
personal values, such as self-fulfillment and self-respect,
because it is driven by the motivations to learn and increase
the accuracy of investment decisions, whereas SNI appeals
to social values, such as having warm relationships with
others and achieving a sense of belonging, which are
inherently linked to the motivations to fulfill socially
oriented needs (Batra et al. 2001). Therefore, we expect
knowledge to relate more strongly to SII than to SNI, and
social needs should relate more strongly to SNI than to SII.
We used the procedure suggested by Chin (2000) to test the
differences between these relationships by analyzing the
differences in the strength of the unstandardized path
coefficients. The results confirm our expectations. Knowl-
edge has a stronger influence on SII than on SNI
Bknow!SII ¼ 0:22 vs:Bknow!SNI ¼ 0:13; t ¼ 16:4; p < 0:001ð Þ,
and social needs have a more pronounced effect on SNI
than on SII Bsocneeds!SNI ¼ 0:48 vs:Bsocneeds!SII ¼ 0:26; t ¼ 39:3;ð
p < 0:001Þ.
We also find support that SII is negatively associated
(H7: β=−0.22, p=0.002) and SNI is moderately positively
associated (H8: β=0.15, p=0.030) with the number of
transactions. Because these results contradict findings by
Mangleburg et al. (2004), who find that SII positively and
SNI negatively influences teens’ shopping frequency with
friends, we call for replication studies that can help
generalize these results.
Finally, we find that knowledge (H9: β=0.22, p<0.001)
is positively associated with transaction frequency.
Study 2
Study 2 tests how consumers’ investments decisions are
altered when they are confronted with informational versus
normative interpersonal influences in an involuntary set-
ting. This study also tests whether CSII moderates the
impact of interpersonal influences.
Table 2 Construct correlations and AVE of Study 1
Construct Knowledge Psycho-social risk Social needs SII SNI Number of transactions
Knowledge 0.89
Psycho-social risk 0.04 (0.08) 0.77
Social needs 0.15 (0.09) 0.24*** (0.07) 0.77
SII −0.08 (0.07) 0.31*** (0.08) 0.47*** (0.08) 0.69
SNI −0.06 (0.07) 0.42*** (0.07) 0.40*** (0.07) 0.62*** (0.06) 0.75
# Transactions 0.24** (0.08) −0.01 (0.07) −0.03 (0.06) −0.15** (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) N/A
The numbers below the diagonal represent the correlations between two latent constructs; the numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors
The numbers in bold represent the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE)





















Figure 2 Structural model
results of Study 1. Notes: a.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01;
***p<0.001. b. Standardized
coefficients are shown. c.
Numbers in bold are squared
multiple correlations.
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Method
Study 2 uses a 2×3 full-factorial between-subjects design
with a hanging control group. We vary the type of
interpersonal influence (informational vs. normative) and
the valence of the influence (positively skewed toward stock
A, neutral, positively skewed toward stock B). Participants
may be exposed to informational influence, normative
influence, or no interpersonal influence (hanging control
group). A sample of 154 students (38% female, mean age
23 years) volunteered to participate and were assigned
randomly to each cell of the design. No significant differ-
ences exist among the cells in terms of gender, age, SNI, SII,
knowledge, psycho-social risk, or social needs (all F-tests,
p>0.50). Therefore, the randomization was effective.
Procedure
After entering the study room, each subject completed a
questionnaire that asked about background characteristics
(age, gender, and risk profile) and included the CSII scale
(Bearden et al. 1989).3 The proctor told subjects there were
no good or bad answers and all data would be treated
anonymously and confidentially. We took care to avoid
heightening the salience of social cues by including an
explicit stop and a filler task between the administration of
the questionnaire and the portion of the study in which
subjects made their investment decisions. For all condi-
tions, we told participants that they unexpectedly had
received €1,000 (approximately $1,500), not needed for
their current expenses, that they could invest (in stock A or
stock B) or put in a savings account that earned 2% interest.
All subjects also received objective information about the
past performance of two shares, such that stock A had a
historical rate of return of 5% per year, and stock B had
identical risk characteristics but a historical rate of return of
5.5%. After being told that there were no transaction costs or
taxes, the subjects indicated, using Likert scales, which portion
of their money they would invest, and, if they had to invest,
what percentage they would invest in stock A versus stock B.
The manipulation confronts subjects with an informa-
tional influence, normative influence, or no interpersonal
influence. The study does not refer to the actual presence of
relevant others to invoke feelings of observability, because
in most cases, this influence would be absent during the
real-life investment decisions.
We manipulate informational interpersonal influence by
providing subjects with a summary of the information of 20
relevant investors. The summary was neutrally framed,
without reference to whether the subjects were closely or
remotely related to these other investors, because the
diagnosticity of and reliance on the source can vary across
respondents and thus influence the decision. To manipulate
the valence of informational interpersonal influence, we
provide either favorable information about stock A (“15
investors mention positive information about stock A and
negative information about B, and 5 investors mention
positive information about stock A and negative about B”),
neutral information (“10 investors mention positive infor-
mation about stock A and negative about B, and 10
investors mention negative information about stock A and
positive about B”), or favorable information about B (“15
investors mention positive information about B and
negative about A, and 5 investors mention positive
information about A and negative about B”).
The normative influence manipulation provides subjects
with a summary of the personal opinions of 20 relevant
investors, indicating these investors’ opinion about what
subjects should prefer, after making a personal request for
these opinions. The manipulation of the valence of the
normative interpersonal influence uses the same approach
as that for informational influence (e.g., “based on their
personal opinion 15 investors say you should prefer stock
A, 5 investors say you should prefer stock B”).
In the absence of any interpersonal influence (hanging
control group), we expect subjects to prefer stock B, which
provides superior historical payoff characteristics. Although
Fama’s (1991) efficient market hypothesis suggests that past
trends in stock prices carry no useful information for
consumers to trade on, consumers typically do take into
consideration past information about investment products
(Johnson and Tellis 2005). People prefer to buy past winners
and sell past losers, even when neither should be preferred
(Johnson et al. 2005). Yet if subjects receive interpersonal
influences indicating that stock A is preferable, we expect it
will lead them to select stock A, despite its lower historical
returns. That is, subjects may choose the stock with lower
expected returns because they (1) believe others have
information that they can use to make better informed
decisions, (2) expect to obtain social rewards or avoid social
punishments, and/or (3) want to increase their self-image.
Manipulation check
Following Perdue and Summers (1986), we performed
manipulation checks during a pilot test, using 38 students.
The subjects performed the complete experiment receiving
either informational or normative influence. We measured
the strength of our manipulation by asking them to identify
the degree to which the investors’ evaluations were
informational (“in the sense that the 20 investors provided
information about the performance of stocks A and B”) or
3 In Studies 2 and 3, we used the same items to measure CSII as in
Study 1. To obtain an index score, we averaged respondents’
responses for each type of interpersonal influence.
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normative (“in the sense that the 20 investors provided their
personal opinion about what stocks you should buy”). Five-
point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5
(totally agree), indicate that subjects in the informational
influence condition (N=19) found the evaluations more
informational than those in the normative influence condition
(N=19) (Minformational=3.53 vs. Mnormative=2.32, p<0.001)
and those in the normative influence condition found the
evaluations more normative than those in the information
influence condition (Minformational=2.26 vs. Mnormative=4.00,
p<0.001). Hence, the manipulation was effective.
Results
The analyses support our expectations. Confronting con-
sumers with interpersonal influences significantly alters
their investment decisions, especially their relative prefer-
ence for different stocks (F(6, 147)=5.02, p<0.001). The
amount of money invested, however, does not vary with
interpersonal influence (F(6, 147)=1.44, p=0.20).4
Subjects in the informational influence scenarios signifi-
cantly differ in their relative preference for stocks, depending
on the valence of the information they receive (F(2, 66) =
13.40, p<0.001, η2=0.29). Similarly, those in the normative
influence conditions significantly differ according to the
valence of the normative message (F(2, 57) = 2.62, p=0.081,
η2=0.08), but at the less restrictive 10% level.
As we show in Table 3, subjects in the informational
influence condition that favors stock A report a greater
preference for stock A (M=2.60) compared with those in
the control condition (M=3.23, t(48)=2.54, p=0.01).
Subjects who receive normative influences in favor of
stock A also tend to choose stock A more than the control
group (M=3.05 vs. M=3.23), but the difference is too small
to distinguish from chance variation (t(42)=0.83, p>0.10).
When confronted with interpersonal influences that favor
stock B, subjects indicate a greater preference for this stock
in the informational (M=3.83, t(46)=2.33, p=0.02) and
normative (M=3.80, t(43)=2.02, p=0.05) setting compared
with the control group.
The insignificant findings for the normative influence
group in the stock A scenario and the lower significance of
normative influence compared with informational influence
in the stock B scenario can be explained in the following
way. In all normative influence conditions, subjects
confront injunctive norms, as they are told what they
should do (Cialdini 2003, 2007). In comparison with
descriptive norms that describe what others have done,
injunctive norms may be less effective for changing
behavior (Cialdini 2003, 2007), because they exert strong
control effects, limit people’s freedom, and often produce
feelings of resentment or psychological reactance (Brehm
1966; Cialdini 2007). The arousal of psychological reac-
tance in a social influence situation leads to a tendency to
disagree with the communicator (Brehm 1966; Burnkrant
and Cousineau 1975). The effect of normative influence in
the stock A scenario may be particularly weak because it
lacks persuasiveness as it was contrary to the objective
information (Cialdini 2003: 109).
We performed separate tests to investigate the interaction
effect of SNI on normative influence and SII on informa-
tional influence, because we posit that the impact of
normative influences may be magnified for consumers
who score high on SNI, whereas the impact of informa-
tional influences may be magnified for consumers scoring
high on SII. Using a median split to divide the subjects into
high or low susceptibility to interpersonal influence
samples (cf. Aaker 1999), we find no significant interaction
effects. That is, the effects of normative influence (F(2, 54)=
0.51, p=0.60) and informational influence (F(2, 63)=0.44,
p=0.65) on subjects’ preference for stock A or stock B are
not strengthened or attenuated by their susceptibility to each
type of influence (Table 4).5
Study 3
Study 3 tests the effects of interpersonal influence in a
voluntary setting rather than the involuntary setting of
Study 2. We investigate whether CSII affects the likelihood
of asking others’ opinions and evaluations and if it
moderates the strength of interpersonal influence.
Method
The method is similar to that for Study 2, except that the
subjects are free to choose to make their investment
decisions without receiving any interpersonal influence
(hanging control group) or request either information
(informational influence) or opinions (normative influence)
from others about the stocks. For subjects requesting to
receive interpersonal information or opinion, we varied the
valence of the influence in a similar manner to Study 2.
Subjects remain unaware of the manipulation, because they
receive blank envelopes labeled “information” or “opin-
ion.” A sample of 277 students (33% female, mean age
23 years) volunteered to participate.
5 We rule out the possibility that this insignificance is due to a trait-
state incongruity (Shedletski and Endler 1974; Rusting 1999), because
our measured “trait” CSII and the “state” of interpersonal influence
both refer to the same domain: investment decisions.
4 We also studied the potential effect of domain-specific knowledge on
investment behavior. Subjects’ level of investment-related knowledge
influences the amount of money invested (more knowledgeable
subjects invest more) but not their relative preference for stocks. The
same results apply to Study 3.
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Procedure
The procedure is similar to that of Study 2 with a few
notable exceptions. Before the experiment started, we told
subjects they could open one of two envelopes, containing
either a summary of personal information or the personal
opinion of 20 relevant investors, or else open no envelope.
In the first part of the experiment, subjects made their
investment decision after deciding whether and which type
of interpersonal influence to receive. In the second part,
they completed the CSII scale after finishing a filler task
and taking a 10 min break, which we use to minimize the
salience of the social cues.
Results
Of the total sample of 277 subjects, 176 (64%) chose to
open the envelope containing interpersonal information
(informational influence), 49 (18%) opened the envelope
containing interpersonal opinions (normative influence),
and 52 (19%) did not open an envelope (control group). We
use logistic regression to test whether each subject’s level
of SII and SNI determines whether he or she opened an
envelope with information or opinions, respectively. Nei-
ther dimension increases the overall percentage of correct
classifications of subjects who open either the informational
or the normative envelope (Nagelkerke R2 values<0.03).
The low significance may result from subjects’ low level of
knowledge (Mknow=2.32) and their resultant strong need
for interpersonal information (i.e., 81% opened an enve-
lope) to learn from other investors about appropriate
investment behavior. Alternatively, the limited amount of
objective information provided in the experiment may have
led the subjects to ask for other investors’ information and
opinions, just to increase their confidence in their invest-
ment decision.
As in Study 2, the analyses again support our expect-
ations that consumers who are confronted with interperson-
al influences significantly alter their relative preference for
each stock (F(6, 270)=30.78, p<0.001), but not the amount
they invest (F(6, 270)=1.27, p=0.27). These results
demonstrate that interpersonal influences affect consumers’
investment decisions, irrespective of whether the setting is
voluntary or involuntary. Subjects who choose to be
exposed to informational influence differ significantly in
their relative preference for stocks, depending on the
valence of the information received (F(2, 173)=78.37,
p<0.001, η2=0.48). Similarly, those who ask for normative
Table 3 Relative preference for stock A and B as a function of interpersonal influence in Study 2 and Study 3












Preference for A a: 2.60c,d,e,f (25) b: 3.05e,f (19) g: 3.28a,e (25) a: 2.21c,d,e,f,g (70) b: 2.45c,d,e,f,g (22) g: 3.60a,b,e (52)
Neutral position c: 3.43a (21) d: 3.48a (21) c: 3.65a,b,e (57) d: 3.46a,b,e (13)
Preference for B e: 3.83a,b,g (23) f: 3.80a,b,g (20) e: 3.96a,b,c,d,g (49) f: 3.93a,b (14)
The preference for stocks is based on the following Likert scale: 1=invest 100% in stock A; 2=75% in stock A and 25% in stock B; 3=50% in
stock A and 50% in stock B; 4=25% in stock A and 75% in stock B; 5=100% invest in stock B
Superscripts represent significant mean differences between cells based on independent sample t-tests (p<0.05), and report cell sizes between
brackets
Table 4 Relative preference for stock A and B as a function of interpersonal influence and susceptibility to interpersonal influence in Study 2 and
Study 3
Study 2 Study 3
Informational influence Normative influence Informational influence Normative influence
Low SII High SII Low SNI High SNI Low SII High SII Low SNI High SNI
Preference for A 2.40 2.73 3.00 3.10 2.49** 1.91** 2.40 2.50
Neutral position 3.20 3.64 3.25 3.78 3.59 3.75 3.60 3.38
Preference for B 3.83 3.82 3.88 3.75 3.81* 4.14* 3.80 4.00
The preference for stocks is based on the following Likert scale: 1=invest 100% in stock A; 2=75% in stock A and 25% in stock B; 3=50% in
stock A and 50% in stock B; 4=25% in stock A and 75% in stock B; 5=100% invest in stock B
*p<0.10; **p<0.01: Mann–Whitney U tests are used to test for significant differences between low vs. high cells
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influences differ significantly in their choices according to
the valence of the normative message (F(2, 46)=11.27,
p<0.001, η2=0.33). Interpersonal influence exhibits a
stronger effect in Study 3 than in Study 2 in terms of the
variance explained, which suggests that subjects follow
interpersonal influences more closely when they actively
request them compared with when they receive them
involuntarily. Furthermore, we again find that informational
influence has a stronger influence than normative influence
on consumers’ investment choices.
As shown in Table 3, the subjects report a greater
preference for stock A when they receive informational
influences (M=2.21) favoring stock A compared with those
in the control condition (M=3.60, t(120)=8.80, p<0.001).
Subjects who receive normative influences (M=2.45) in
support of stock A also tend to favor stock A more strongly
compared with the control group (M=3.60, t(72)=4.92,
p<0.001). When receiving interpersonal influence that favors
stock B, subjects indicate a greater preference for this stock in
both the informational (M=3.96, t(99)=2.42, p=0.018) and
the normative (M=3.93, t(64)=1.34, p>0.10) settings com-
pared with the control group, though the difference is not
significant for the latter, likely because of the relatively
strong preference for stock B in the control group.
As in Study 2, we again perform separate tests to
investigate whether the dimensions of CSII moderate the
impact of interpersonal influence. Median splits divide the
sample of subjects into high or low susceptibility to
interpersonal influence groups. In the voluntary setting of
Study 3, we observe a significant interaction effect between
SII and informational influence; that is, the effect of
informational influence (F(2, 173)=5.36, p=0.006) on
subjects’ preference for stock A or stock B is strengthened
by subjects’ SII (Table 4). However, as in Study 2, we do
not find a significant interaction effect between SNI and
normative influence (F(2, 46)=0.17, p=0.85). The relative-
ly small cell sizes (i.e., the smallest cell contains 5
observations) in the normative setting make these results




To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
investigate empirically the antecedents and consequences of
CSII and the impact of interpersonal influences in an
investment context. We provide a theoretical explanation
for why some consumers are more susceptible to interper-
sonal influence in an investment context than are others, as
well as what consequences this susceptibility may create.
Although existing literature implicitly assumes that suscep-
tibility to interpersonal influence plays an important role
only for conspicuous or (socially) visible products, we
demonstrate its relevance for investments, a less conspic-
uous and less visible product category.
The results of Study 1 confirm our hypotheses and
demonstrate that consumers are especially susceptible to
interpersonal influences when they lack necessary invest-
ment-related knowledge, perceive investing to be a risky
activity in terms of the associated psychological and social
risks, and have strong social needs. Although extant
literature pays little attention to the influence of social
needs (cf. Batra et al. 2001), the results from Study 1 show
that these needs have the greatest influence on CSII in an
investment context. To increase our understanding of CSII
in an investment situation, researchers should devote more
attention to investing as a social activity (Shiller 1984;
Hoffmann 2007) and its potential expressive benefits
(Statman 2004). Another important finding from Study 1
reveals that consumers who are more susceptible to
informational influences trade less, whereas those who are
more susceptible to normative influences trade more.
Study 2 and Study 3 show how consumers, with varying
levels of CSII, are affected by interpersonal influences in a
voluntary and non-voluntary context. Overall, the results
show that consumers strongly alter their preference for
stocks when experiencing interpersonal influences, and
make decisions that are in line with the valence of the
social influence, even though this may result in selecting
investments with lower past returns.
Study 2 and Study 3 display the differences between
consumers who involuntary receive or actively (voluntary)
request interpersonal influence. Consumers follow the
information and opinions of others more closely when they
can choose the type of interpersonal influence they obtain
rather than when they are involuntary confronted with it.
We also observe that SII strengthens the effect of
informational influences on consumers’ investment choices
in the voluntary context but not in the involuntary context.
This significant interaction effect does not appear to be a
demand artifact, because more susceptible respondents are
not more likely to open a corresponding envelope.
The overall pattern of findings of our three studies
suggests that in comparison with normative influences,
informational influences play a stronger role in shaping
consumers’ investment-related behavior. This result is
consistent with prior studies that imply consumers are more
motivated to build knowledge by requesting information
from and observing their social environment rather than
conforming to others’ expectations as a means to mediate
social punishments and rewards and/or improve their self-
images (Burnkrant and Cousineau 1975; Park and Lessig
1977; Mangleburg et al. 2004).
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Implications for marketing and public policy
This research has several important implications for
marketing managers and public policymakers. In particular,
by elaborating on the role of others in consumers’
investment decision making, it can help marketers to better
target and promote their products to clients.
Specifically, consumers who are susceptible to interper-
sonal influences when they make investment decisions will
be attentive observers of others’ product and portfolio
choices and rely on the opinions of these others more often.
These consumers therefore may be more responsive to
certain types of advertising, such as testimonials, expert
opinions, or celebrity endorsements. Furthermore, because
these consumers likely find the social aspects of investing
particularly important, a valuable marketing strategy would
offer them the possibility of interacting with similar others
and discussing their investment decisions, such as through
an online broker’s Web forum.
Another important implication for managers emerges
from the finding that consumer innovativeness relates
negatively to CSII (Clark and Goldsmith 2006). Since CSII
relates negatively to consumers’ level of investment-related
knowledge, financially educating consumers may benefit
both consumers and companies. Providing financial educa-
tion makes consumers more independent and prudent
investors. Moreover, it limits their susceptibility to inter-
personal influences, which may prompt them to adopt new
financial products and services more readily and earlier in
the product life cycle. Marketers could capitalize on CSII
by organizing “master classes,” during which consumers
can learn and talk about new financial products. Such
meetings also may reduce consumers’ perceived (psycho-
social) risks and increase their confidence about making
accurate investment decisions. Companies should strike a
careful balance between confronting consumers with
interpersonal influences (e.g., through bank employees)
and letting them interact with those employees and relevant
others, because consumers are most strongly influenced
when they are free to ask others, not when they are
involuntarily confronted with (company-driven) interper-
sonal influence. Facilitating consumers’ interactions seems
to provide the most effective strategy, though at the expense
of less company control over the timing, frequency, and
content of these interactions.
Finally, considering the strong connections between
susceptibility to interpersonal influence and conformity
(Clark and Goldsmith 2006) and between conformist
behavior and herding (Hirschleifer 2001), public policy-
makers should take notice of the situations in which
investors are more or less likely to be susceptible to
interpersonal influences and monitor changes in investors’
susceptibility over time. A steady rise in susceptibility may
function as an early warning system for crashes and hypes
related to conformist behavior.
Limitations and further research
Our study contains several limitations that provide interest-
ing avenues for further research. First, though our research
demonstrates both how susceptibility to interpersonal
influences affects consumers’ transaction frequency (Study
1) and how consumers change their investment decisions in
the presence of such interpersonal influences (Study 2 and
3), it does not address how CSII and interpersonal
influences may affect returns on investment portfolios.
Additional research could link susceptibility to interperson-
al influences to investors’ returns and address the poten-
tially different impacts of SII versus SNI.
Second, survey approaches, such as that we used in
Study 1, may suffer from common-method variance, which
may inflate (or deflate) relationships (Doty and Glick
1998). We checked for potential method bias by performing
a Harman’s single-factor test, using CFA (Podsakoff et al.
2003), and find poor fit for the one-factor model (χ2/df=
7.44; GFI=0.75; CFI=0.60; RMSEA=0.15), which sug-
gests common-method variance does not pose a serious
threat for Study 1. However, a selection bias also could
affect the results of Study 1, because our respondents come
from investment-related Web sites and were willing to
invest their free time to complete the questionnaire.
Therefore, they likely have a greater interest in investment
research and knowledge than does the general population.
Because visitors to these Web sites can post messages and
interact with others, it is also more likely that these
respondents perceive investing as a “social activity” (Shiller
1984).
Third, the homogeneous samples of Study 2 and 3 and
the specific context of all studies (investing in stocks)
warrant follow-up studies to investigate whether the effects
we find in the voluntary and involuntary contexts hold for
different situations (e.g., bonds, mortgages) and different
demographic and socio-economic groups.
Fourth, Study 2 uses psychological reactance to explain
the less significant impact of normative influence, but we
do not measure it. In Study 3, we gauged subjects’
reactance by measuring the extent to which the interper-
sonal influences irritated them. As we expected, reactance
was relatively low in this voluntary setting, which may help
explain the stronger impact of normative influences in
Study 3. However, further studies are needed to draw any
final conclusions about the impact of reactance.
Fifth, the current measure of CSII focuses on personal
influences, that is, the influence of friends and relatives.
Additional research could broaden this concept by consid-
ering the susceptibility of consumers to other, less closely
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related, sources of information, such as business experts,
bank employees, or investment-related Web sites. Such
studies offer a rich venue for research, especially consid-
ering the tremendous growth of financial information
received from online investment clubs and Web sites.
Sixth, similar to most existing consumer research, our
study focuses on the effect of knowledge per se while
investigating CSII in an investment context. However,
differences may exist between consumers’ objective and
subjective knowledge, i.e., knowledge miscalibration (Alba
and Hutchinson 2000). Research should investigate how
knowledge miscalibration may affect susceptibility to and
the impact of interpersonal influence in an investment
context. Subjective knowledge may be more strongly
associated with CSII than objective knowledge. Consumers
who believe they have a high level of investment-related
knowledge may find it unnecessary to ask others for advice,
regardless of their level of objective knowledge. Moreover,
they may be less influenced by interpersonal influences.
Consumers also might overestimate their ability to judge
the validity of the information and opinions provided by
others, which would make them vulnerable to interpersonal
persuasion attempts by salespersons for example. Finally,
knowledge miscalibration could lead to overconfidence and
thus affect investment performance through overtrading
(Morrin et al. 2002; Odean and Barber 2000).
Despite these limitations, this research contributes signif-
icantly to consumer behavior and marketing literature and
offers important insights for marketing practice by shedding
light on the processes by which reference group influences
operate in an investment context and affect consumers’
investment decisions. Providing such insights may help
consumers to make better informed investment decisions
and responds to the recent call by Bazerman (2001) for a more
consumer-focused approach in the field of financial services.
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